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ABSTRACT: Gilles Deleuze's critical reception
of Plato´s philosophy is developed under the
formula of its reversal, the task Nietzsche
entrusted future philosophy with. But what
does this reversal mean? Deleuze's reversal of
Platonism has been widely discussed. Most of
the studies focus mainly on “Platon et le
simulacre”, where Deleuze characterizes
reversal on the basis of the concept of
simulacrum, and his further elaboration in
Difference and repetition. An aspect of
reversal that has not been considered so far is
Deleuze's reversal of the Platonic image of
thought, which is expressed through his critical
reading of Plato's theory of anámnesis. In our
paper we show that this criticism is a
fundamental core of the task of reversal.
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RESUMO: A recepção crítica de Gilles Deleuze
da filosofia de Platão é desenvolvida sob a
fórmula de sua reversão, a tarefa com a qual
Nietzsche confiou a filosofia futura. Mas o que
essa inversão significa? A inversão de Deleuze
do platonismo tem sido amplamente discutida.
A maioria dos estudos se concentra
principalmente em “Platon et le simulacre”,
onde Deleuze caracteriza a reversão com base
no conceito de simulacro, e sua posterior
elaboração em Diferença e repetição. Um
aspecto da reversão que não foi considerado até
agora é a inversão de Deleuze da imagem
platônica do pensamento, que é expressa
através de sua leitura crítica da teoria da
anámnesis de Platão. Em nosso artigo,
mostramos que essa crítica é um núcleo
fundamental da tarefa de reversão.
PALAVRAS­CHAVE: Deleuze; Platão;
reminiscência; Diferença e Repetição; Imagem
do pensamento
INTRODUCTION
Gilles Deleuze's critical reception of Plato´s philosophy is developed underthe formula of its reversal, the task Nietzsche entrusted future philosophy
with. But what does this reversal mean? This topic has been widely discussed. It has
often been emphasized that the role that Plato plays in his work, as Deleuze himself
puts it, is an ambiguous one. His strategy in “Platon et le simulacre” is to find reversal
inside Plato's own philosophy (Deleuze, 1969: 292­295) and in Différence et répétition
he explicitly states that it is not only inevitable but also desirable that reversal preserves
a lot of platonic elements (Deleuze, 1968: 82).
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According to Wolff (1992) Plato is an unstable figure in Deleuze's work because
he introduces and at the same time breaks the conceptual oppositions Deleuze sets to
disarticulate. Wolff finds that Deleuze shares Derrida´s and Foucault´s intention as
historians of Platonism, that is, to find in Plato the first chapter of a philosophical
narrative that we could call the “history of metaphysics”. Consequently, they share a
procedure by means of which they follow the trail of this major event in the platonic
source: to scrutiny the pages in search for a phrase, a sign that betrays the birth of that
will to truth that takes the name of “Platonism”. But, according to Wolff, Deleuze is not
as suspicious as his colleagues, because he still reads the dialogues as bearers of
acceptable statements, not only as significant in virtue of their symptomatic meaning.
(p. 169).
Ginoux, (2005) refers to the ambiguity of Plato´s role in deleuzian philosophy as
a phármakon that constitutes the venom as well as the remedy to the decade of
representative thinking. She stresses that unlike the role that Plato plays in Nietzsche's
philosophy, which is mainly negative, in Deleuze's work Plato has a double face (p.
156­157). As Ginoux points out, there is a profound influence of Plato in Deleuze´s
work. It is from the Platonic source, mainly the Sophist, that Deleuze extracts the initial
outline of the subordination of difference to the four fundamental instances of
representation (identity, likeness, opposition and analogy) in Différence et répétition.
Moreover, in Logique du sens, Deleuze takes Plato´s image of the sage as the paradigm
of the classic philosopher that influenced the conception of what a philosopher is in the
tradition of Idealism (Deleuze, 1969: 152). Also, in this same text, he puts forward the
Platonic philosophy as the paradigm of classic philosophy that gets reverted by the
Stoics for the first time history (1969: 34).1 In Anti­OEdipe, a book in which the main
objective is the critique of some key concepts of psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari
trace the inaugural moment of the conception of desire as a shortage (manque) to Plato
(1972:32­33) and in Qu´est­ce que la philosophie, they locate Platonism at the
inflection point in which philosophy subordinates the plan d´immanence that the
Presocratics traced to the transcendence of a universal concept (the One, the Whole, the
Idea of Good).
Taking upon Ginoux´s and Wolff´s statements about the ambiguous role that
Plato plays in Deleuze´s philosophy, my purpose in this paper is to look into those
elements of Platonism that are worth keeping. Even though it has been well explained
that Deleuze does not overthrow the entire corpus of Plato´s philosophy, the question of
which elements of Platonism he preserves is still open. Most of the studies focus mainly
on “Platon et le simulacre”, where Deleuze characterizes reversal on the basis of the
concept of simulacrum, and his further elaboration in Difference and repetition.2
(Alliez, 1992; Williams, 2003; Smith, 2006; De Beistegui, 2010; Heredia Ríos, 2011)
But an aspect of reversal that has not been fully considered so far is Deleuze's reversal
of the Platonic image of thought as expressed through his critical reading of Plato's
theory of anámnesis. In the present paper I intend to show (a) that this criticism is a
fundamental core of the task of reversal and (b) that the element worth keeping, besides
the concept of simulacrum, is Plato´s construction of what Deleuze calls the object of
encounter, which, ironically, presents an alternative to the object of recollection.
My exposition is divided in three sections. The first one focuses in the ambiguity
of Platonism as Deleuze as expressed by Deleuze´s use of the platonic concept of
simulacrum. In Différence et répétition Deleuze presents the reversal of Platonism in
the first chapter of this book, where he explains the logic and ontology of difference
according to Plato's method of division. To a great extent, this text is an expanded


































Deleuze's reversal ofPlatonism:Focusonhis criticismofanámnesis
criticism to Plato's anámnesis as part of a broader critical reading of Plato's philosophy
as a figure of the dogmatic image of thought. Strictly speaking, in this text Deleuze
stresses the ambiguity of the role of Plato´s philosophy not in the first chapter, in
relation to the concept of simulacrum, but in the third chapter, in relation to the role that
anámnesis plays in the dogmatic image of thought. The second section is therefore
focused on this connection between Plato´s recollection theory and the epistemic model
of recognition, which constitutes the fourth postulate of the dogmatic image of thought
that Deleuze sets to overthrow. Recognition is defined by the concordance of the
faculties upon an object that is supposed to be the same for every one of them. It is the
same object that can be touched, seen, remembered, imagined, conceived, etc. Thought
is supposed to be the unity of all these faculties and its epistemic correlate is the “object
of recognition”. In the third section I will address the opposition between the “object of
encounter”, which constitutes the genesis of thought according to Deleuze and the
“object of recognition”. I will try to show that the relevance of the Deleuzian reversal
lies in the fact that he elaborates the notion of the object of encounter from within the
Platonic source.
THE REVERSAL AND THE SIMULACRUM
The main concept of Deleuze´s reversal is the simulacrum. This concept has
attracted the attention of most scholars, even though it is a concept that Deleuze himself
later dismissed as “not worth much” (Deleuze, 2003, p. 339). In this letter to Jean­Clet
Martin, he affirms that the concept of rhizome expresses multiplicity far better than the
concept of simulacrum (idem). Non­the less, it is by means of the simulacrum that
Deleuze unveils the multiplicity behind the platonic Idea.
It is agreed among scholars that the essential aspect of reversal is the claim that
identity cannot be the foundation of selection, which is a consequence of the disruption
of representation by the simulacrum. It has been noted that the methodology unfolded
in Deleuze's interpretation of simulacrum consists of a symptomatological reading. This
means that Deleuze´s interpretation of Plato's statements focuses on the results of the
forces expressed in the text beyond the logic of the author function (Alliez, 1992: 157).
Deleuze digs up a hidden Plato: given a concept such as the simulacrum we must take it
as a symptom. And the question we must ask is “what is it a symptom of”? Deleuze´s
diagnosis is: it is a symptom of a will to select. This is the way in which the will to
power expresses itself in Plato´s work. The will to select is the motivation that hides
within the theory of Ideas and it needs to be brought out to light in order to reverse
Platonism.
It has also been noted that Deleuze's reversal must be read not only as an
objection to Platonism, but as a rejuvenated Platonism in which the concept of
simulacrum introduces a new conception of Platonic Idea, not as identical (autó
kath´hautó), but as immanent and differential. According to Smith (2006), this gives a
new meaning to selection, repetition and un­grounding (pp. 19­26).3 Smith states that
Deleuze´s reversal has three main premises. The first one is the claim that,
unlike the copy, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance; the second
one states that if the simulacrum is an image without resemblance, it is
because the Idea itself no longer has the identity of a self­same model, but
rather is now constituted by difference­in­itself; and the third one states that the
mode under which this disparity or difference is apprehended is a problematic



































mistake. According to Smith, this unleashes the power of pseûdos (falsehood):
“truth” now becomes an affirmation of the simulacrum itself, falsity (art) affirmed and
raised to a higher power” (2006, p. 16). The deceitful character of the simulacrum is a
constituent element of the platonic use of this concept. In Deleuze´s reading, this
deceitful trait, combined with the absence of a Model (the simulacrum does not follow
the Idea as parádeigma) affirms the puissance of the simulacrum: the power of pseûdos
that reveals the Idea as obsolete.
De Beistegui (2012) restores the importance of the development of the concept
of simulacrum and Deleuze´s project of reversal in the light of the lineament of his later
work, namely, how to think and live without transcendence. According to him Deleuze
reverses the terms of the problem posed by Plato, i.e., how to select copies among
simulacra, in order to reveal that it is possible to think images outside the framework of
representation, in order to produce an image of thought that is based on a different
thought of the image (2012: 77). De Beistegui focuses on another trait of the
simulacrum, namely, it´s immanence. In the Sophist, Plato explains the operation
behind the thaumatic4 effect of the simulacrum with a very eloquent example. While the
copy respects the proportion relations provided by the model, the simulacrum doesn´t,
for it is built very much like the way a sculptor builds a big scale monument (Sof. 235d­
236a). An example of how these sculptors proceed is the Epicurean inscription of the
wall of Oenoanda, where the letters inscribed in the superior lines are larger than the
inferior ones so that the text is presented as homogeneous and proportionate to the
observer that stands on the floor. Deleuze´s interpretation follows Xavier Audouard,
who accurately reads this as an expression of the immanent character of these images,
where the observer is part of the referential system, much like the role of the observer in
Mach´s principle. This is why he understands that the main problem behind Plato´s
simulacrum is the problem of the Subject as foundation of phaenomena (Audouard,
1966).
I agree with these readings on the fact that the simulacrum serves the purpose of
showing the idle character of Forms as metaphysical foundation of knowledge and
being. But I think that this is exactly the purpose that the simulacrum serves in the
Sophist and, therefore, this is not a proper critique against Plato. At least not the Plato of
the last period, who by the time that he wrote this dialogue, had already exposed the
limitations of Forms and of the concept of participation in the Parmenides.5 The
distinction between Plato´s middle dialogues and his last dialogues, among
which we can find the Sophist, is, however, not considered by Deleuze´s critique.
Deleuze accurately puts forward the power of the combination of myth and
dialectics. He also accurately demonstrates that this distinction ceases to be valid when
the dialectic discovers in the division its true method: on the one hand, division needs
myth as the foundation that produces difference and the myth needs division as the state
of difference in that which is founded. Forms operate as criteria for selection in the area
already distributed by myth and division. The way in which the Idea operates is clearly
seen in the Platonic notion of "participation" (méthexis). The platonic concept of
méthexis comes from the verb metékho ("to have part of" or "to take part in").
According to Deleuze the structure of participation is a threefold one: the essence of the
foundation gives some quality or property in participation to the participant, that
Deleuze calls the "suitor". The fair suitor is the authentic, the well­founded pretender,
the copy or icon, while the ill­founded suitors are his fakes, his simulacra. Such is, for
example, the case of the sophist who is the jester, the satyr of the philosopher. If we
follow Deleuze´s interpretation, the subtext in Plato´s lógos is that the role of the Form
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This interpretation is incisive because it reveals the motivation behind the
Platonic concept of Form. It is, moreover, original, because it finds an articulation
between the method of division, the dialectic and the use of the myth that is totally
novel and describes very well the general purpose of the Plato of the middle dialogues.
Especially if one considers the struggle of Plato against relativism presented as a
struggle against sophistry (and sometimes against Heraclitism). However, the scheme
by which Deleuze describes the Platonic machinery mixes two moments of his
philosophy that must be properly differentiated since they do not describe the same use
of the concept of Form. This is important because his criticism points to the notion of
participation and to the concept of Form that is subsidiary to it. These two concepts, as
well as the theory of anámnesis that completes the gnoseological system of the middle
dialogues are discarded by Plato in the period of old age. The gnoseology of the middle
dialogues relies upon the theory of recollection that guarantees the human access to the
noetic, identified with the divine. Human knowledge, while defective with respect to
the divine, nevertheless is capable of accessing divine truths. The late epistemology, on
the contrary, renounces this way of thinking the Forms. The notion of méthexis, that
explained the relation of phenomena to the Forms, is replaced by the notions of
koinonia (communication) and of symploké (combination) (Sof. 248a), which are links
between Ideas, but not between Ideas and the sensible. In the Sophist, the Forms are not
the ontological criteria for empirical individuals. They combine and communicate
among them and with the mégista géne, determining the realm of the combinations that
lógos admits. The task of the dialectician is to know and master those combinations
(Sof. 249d­254d).6 With this in mind, we can assume that it is most likely that the
irony that Deleuze attributes to the Sophist was intended. Indeed, the entire search
for a definition of sophistry is but an ironic attempt that ends up in a playful definition
(Sof. 268d)
DELEUZE CRITICAL READING OF PLATO´S THEORY OF ANÁMNESIS
As I said before, there is an aspect of reversal that is systematically omitted by
the comments on reversal even though it is, I believe, a fundamental core of the subject.
As it has been well noticed, Deleuze presents the reversal of Platonism in the first
chapter of Différence et répétition, where he explains the logic and ontology of
difference according to Plato´s method of division. To a large degree, this text is an
expanded version of what is stated in Platon et le simulacre, but Deleuze introduces an
interesting reflection on the role of anámnesis that is absent in the latter and that will be
resumed in the third chapter. This contains, I believe, another aspect of reversal. Here,
Deleuze affirms that Plato´s gnoseology is functional to the fourth postulate of the
dogmatic image of thought, the model of recognition, and that anámnesis works as a
repentance (Deleuze, 1968, pp. 184­192).
The main argument Deleuze directs against anámnesis is that the appeal to the
immortality of the soul, as well as the idea that knowledge exists before it is recollected
reduces knowledge to a mere recognition of preexisting meanings (1968: 185). In
Deleuze´s view, knowledge and, more accurately, the process of thinking, consist in the
creation of meaning. This is why in my opinion Deleuze´s critique of Plato´s
recollection theory directs against Plato the same argument Socrates directs against
Meno in the homonymous dialogue. Namely, that his description of knowledge renders
us indolent.



































of anámnesis. The first one is the attempt of including time into the process of thinking,
even though it is a mythical conception of time, which brings down the original
attempt. The second one is the idea that there is an opacity that is intrinsic to the
process of thinking. Non­the less, these attempts become obsolete with Plato´s appeal to
the transcendent character of knowledge.
In the first place, Deleuze objects that the correlate of recollection is always an
intelligible object, which renders idle the appeal to the senses. According to Deleuze,
the object of recollection should not be called intelligible, for this term expresses a
modality of the object. Tacitly, this implies that it could also also be perceived by the
senses, but, strictly speaking, the object of anámnesis can only be apprehended by the
intellect: it is a noetós, pure essence. According to Deleuze, the object of recollection
should be called the being of the intelligible itself, because this expression refers
literally to “that which can only be apprehended by the intellect” (1968: 182­3). The
problem is that Plato himself appeals to sense perception as the first instance of our
apprehension of the object of anámnesis when it actually has no way to apprehend it.
Therefore, he installs a dislocation at the heart of the learning process.
In the Phaedo remembrance is described as an intuition. The term is ennoéo ("to
have in the mind"), a sort of understanding (73d). The kind of knowledge that
recollection accounts for is a special type of knowledge that Plato expresses with the
term paragígnomai ("to come up", or "to appear to mind", although it also means "to
help", a connotation that is not absent in Plato´s reconstruction of recollection). Plato
gives a few examples to explain this intuition. From these examples there is one that is
especially useful in order to understand Deleuze´s critique, it is the example of the
wooden logs. In this section of the dialogue Plato states that similar objects are similar
in virtue of their participation of the Form of Equality (autò tò íson). The reason is that
the imperfection of the equality sensed between equal objects always fails with respect
to the Idea of the perfect equality. The Form of Equality is in itself (autós) and is
therefore different from the equality perceived by the senses and from the equal objects.
Therefore it stands as something separate and transcendent that determines and shapes
the sensible experience. Plato´s argument states that if we perceive two objects as
similar, given that they present differences as much as similarities, this means that there
is something in our soul that shapes these objects as similar, and this is the Form of
Equality (74b­c). This means that in addition to being separate and transcendent, the
Form of Equality is epistemologically prior to sense perception. This is intended to
explain a general trait of the way we think.7
If the argument stopped at this point, Plato would be a mere idealist and
wouldn´t draw Deleuze´s attention. The interesting turn is that in addition to the
description of the process by which we perceive equal objects, Plato is concerned with
describing the way we develop the knowledge of the existence of such a thing as the
Form of Equality, and in this process, the sense perception of equal things is an
unavoidable part of the process. This supposes a double reading of recollection, one
directed to the general public and another one directed exclusively to those whose
intention is to grasp the Forms. While the prior process of recollection is available to
everyone, the process of knowledge of the Forms is directed to the initiated public. To
those who, just as Socrates´s interlocutors in the Phaedo, are interested in philosophy
(see Scott, 1999).
The way in which Plato presents recollection gives senses a crucial role in the
process of thought because, unlike Cartesian innatism, recollection needs the senses in
order to be triggered and can therefore remain unrealized. But, as Deleuze objects, Plato
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knowledge a pure essence that has no trace of it´s empirical origin.
The second objection that Deleuze directs against anámnesis is that Plato
confuses the past­being with the being of the past. The mechanism is the same: Plato
replaces the empirical past with a mythical one8 and erasing al traces of its
empirical origin. Empirical memory addresses things that have necessarily been
apprehended by other faculties. What I remember, I have seen, touched,
understood, imagined or thought before. The anámnesis, however, is directed to an
object that from the first time cannot be but remembered. This memory is not of a
contingent past, but of the being of the past as such: a past of all times, an absolute past
that is not related to a specific present (1968: 183). The time present also becomes
absolute and therefore time doesn´t really affect it (nor history) or our knowledge of it.
The same can be said about oblivion. In the empirical memory, it is a contingent
incapacity that separates us from a given memory. But in recollection it is a power of
memory itself, "nth power", that which can only be remembered (1968: 183). Oblivion
constitutes the limit of recollection and it´s object, at the same time: it is an immemorial
memorandum. This scheme hides an implicit statement: that which can only be
remembered (the object of absolute oblivion) is also impossible to remember (because
it traces the limit of memory).
THE VIOLENCE OF THE GENESIS OF THOUGHT
Deleuze suggests that, pace Plato's theory of anámnesis, Plato's dialogues
portray the act of thinking not as arising from a moment of recognition, but from a
fundamental encounter that forces thought to arise. This encounter can be apprehended
under different affective tonalities (admiration, love, hate, pain, etc.) but its main
characteristic is that it can only be perceived. It cannot be remembered, imagined or
conceived. It is not aisthetón (what can be perceived), but aisthetéon (what cannot be
but perceived). What cannot be but perceived is the sign. Every time Deleuze
refers to the violence of encounter as the genesis of thought, he traces its origin to Plato
(1962:124, 1964:122­124; 1968:181; 1969: 184). He refers a passage in the Republic in
which Socrates says that what excites or invites (parakaléo) thinking are those
perceptions that produce contradiction (enantían aísthesin), while the things that are
easily recognizable, like a finger, do not (Rep. 523b­d).
"Here, I show," I said, "if you can make it out, that some objects of sensation do
not summon the intellect to the activity of investigation because they seem to be
adequately judged by sense, while others bid it in every way to undertake a
consideration because sense seems to produce nothing healthy." (523b)9
The finger is the paradigm of the object of recognition while the opposed
perceptions constitute the violence that forces thinking to arise, the object of encounter.
This is, according to Deleuze, the role of signs.
"The ones that don't summon the intellect," I said, "are all those that don't at the
same time go over to the opposite sensation. But the ones that do go over I class among
those that summon the intellect, when the sensation doesn't reveal one thing any more
than its opposite, regardless of whether the object strikes the senses from near or far off.
But you will see my meaning more clearly this way: these, we say, would be three
fingers­the smallest, the second, and the middle." (523c)10
According to Deleuze, even though the idea that the violence of encounter is the
origin of thought is traceable to a Platonic source, anámnesis states the exact opposite,



































wrapped in (envelopée) the perceived object.11 This is why it works as a sort of
repentance (1968: 185).
As we said, absolute oblivion works as the limit of memory. The problem is that
Plato confuses the limit of the faculty with a transcendental, noetic object. The limit of
perception is what cannot be perceived either because it is too big or too small, but
Plato replaces this limit with a noetic transcendental object that can only be recovered
by this absolute memory, extracted from an immemorial past (1968: 181­186).
Deleuze first developed this argument in Proust et les signes, where he puts
Proust's reminiscence in contrast with Platonic recollection. A la recherche du temps
perdu is the description of a process of learning in which memory plays a central role.
While at first sight Proust's conception might seem Platonic —to learn is to
remember—, memory is just a tool for him. In Proust's recollection, the process of
learning exceeds memory in principle and in its purpose. Proust's recollection is
directed to the future, not to the past (1964:10). The objects of this process are the
signs, which, as opposed to Platonic Forms, are the object of a concrete sort of
knowledge, not an abstract one. Time is part of the empirical process of learning and the
past remembered is not an immemorial past.
In Proust´s recollection, involuntary memory is triggered by a perception: an old
feeling superimposes and connects to the actual feeling and extends it over several
periods at the same time. But this superimposition does not imply the absolute recovery
of that contingent past. The remembered feeling connects to the actual one and gives
place to the ambiguity of that contrast (1964:23). An example is the famous passage of
the cupcake. Its flavor mixed with the tea unchains a series of associations: aunt Léonie,
Sunday morning at Combray, the joy, the old grey house, the town, etc. (Proust, 1919:
65 ff.).
This recollection is nothing like the Plato's. In Phaedo, recollection consists in
the noetic association between two objects. This association is triggered by the
perception of one of them, like the cloak and the lyre reminds Cebes of his lover, or
Cebes reminds Socrates of Simmias (Phaed. 73d ­74a). In Proust's, one perception, in
this case the flavor, recalls a feeling, in this case, the joy, which in turn recalls a
previous context that connects to the present context and its actual feeling, in this case,
anguish.
THE EXOGENETIC CHARACTER OF THOUGHT
According to Deleuze perception, memory, imagination, intelligence and thought
itself can all be performed either voluntarily or involuntarily. Voluntary performance is
also contingent given that when we voluntarily perceive something, we can also
imagine, remember and conceive it, and the other way around. Only under this
condition can we speak of the unity of faculties. Only when they perform harmoniously
in the context of the arbitrary and the abstract they meet their truth, which is equally
abstract (1964: 123). When violence forces us to think, the faculties perform
involuntarily and this entails their necessity. They cease to be interchangeable: each one
of them discovers only what it can interpret; each one of them relates to a specific realm
of signs.
A fundamental aspect of the Deleuzian image of thought is the discordant use of
the faculties. They do not coincide in an object or in a subject (1968: 181­192). In
Deleuze's image, thought is exogenetic. This means, firstly, that thought cannot be self­
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conditions of thought are not given within thought, they come from without, from the
encounter with the sign. But that does not mean that it is external to the realm of signs.
Its conditions come from without, but it is, at the same time, immanent to its object (De
Beistegui, 2010: 13).
Thought is not a natural possibility but an act of creation. In any case, what is
natural for thought is a state of stupefaction that needs to be shaken from without (1964:
118). And the act of thinking entails a task of interpreting, decoding and translating the
plurivocity of sense implicated in the signs. There are no explicit meanings or clear
ideas. According to Deleuze, this complexity is insinuated by Plato's use of the aporia
of sense perception in Rep. 523b­d and, we may add, in the process of anámnesis in the
Meno. Sadly, the object of anámnesis is noetic and that steals away all interference of
sense perception or of aporiai in the construction of its object. Thought is thus relegated
to a passivity that consists of the mere reception of complete and fully existing
meanings, where there is no place for creation, which is thought's defining character
according to Deleuze.
CONCLUSION
In the introduction to this paper I set myself to the task of showing that
Deleuze´s critical reading of Plato's theory of anámnesis is a fundamental aspect of the
reversal of the dogmatic image of thought. Based on the idea, put forward by Wolff and
Ginoux, that Plato´s ambiguity in Deleuze´s thought amounts to the disarticulation of
the metaphysical oppositions that it inaugurates and that Plato´s influence is not to be
taken merely as a negative one, I proposed a reading based on the positive elements that
Deleuze extracts from Plato´s work and uses in his own. The simulacrum is one of
them, and much has been said about Deleuze´s use of this concept. Nonetheless, the
concept of the object of encounter expresses, far more eloquently than the simulacrum
does, the Heraclitean force that roars in the core of Plato´s dialogues since it describes
the genesis of thought as an excitement (the term used by Plato is parakaléo) that
comes from beyond, form the aporia in which the senses leave us.
Although it is true that the simulacrum serves the purpose of showing the idle
character of Forms, both as paradigms and as metaphysical foundation, I tried to argue
that Plato himself saw this limit of his conceptual construction. Plato himself presents
all the possible objections to the concepts of Forms and participation in the Parmenides,
the dialogue that immediately precedes the Sophist that gives Deleuze the basis for his
reading of the simulacrum. This dialogue presents a renewed epistemology, based on a
different conception of Forms that articulate a far more complex conception of the
specificity of philosophical knowledge as the mastering of the correct combination of
Forms and genres both in thought and in lógos. As I said, it is most likely that Plato
intended the final irony that Deleuze denounces, for this new version of the Forms
manages without participation.
On the other hand, there is the concept of the object of encounter, this empirical
and violently aporetic genesis of thought that Deleuze highlights. This is Plato´s most
entangled character: the empirical face that keeps sticking out in the realms of Idealism.
It is also a sensible subject among his commentators that cannot come to an agreement
as into which role to assign to sense perception in platonic philosophy. There is a
simplistic view of the division the platonic gnoseology presents that opposes the
sensitive things that are perceived to the intelligible things that are intelligible. A more



































epistemology in the later dialogues, that is, as a synthesis between an Eleatic position
that requires the statism of the object of the nóesis, and an Heraclitean position that
affirms the permanent mobilization of all correlates of perception. These positions
require different types of correlates, one for perception, mobile and changing,
corruptible; this object becomes (gígnesthai) but it does not properly exist (eînai), the
other is the object of noûs, static and permanent, incorruptible; this object properly
exists (eînai) and does not become (gígnesthai). This position is the one that becomes
manifest in the Theaetetus, where perception is discarded as a form of epistéme because
its object does not remain stable. To this way of interpreting the Platonic foundation of
the episteme lays the assumption that the theory of ideas is elaborated on the basis of
the model of perception (Runciman 1959; Ryle, 1990).12 This problem is clear to
Deleuze who, however, is not concerned with trying to save Plato from the
aporiai raised from this analogy. Deleuze focuses on the epistemic limitations of this
model to indicate which are the problems that are presented to Plato as a consequence
of his attempt to erect a transcendental plane that is traced from the empirical plane.
This truly opens up a gate to it´s reversal: is it possible to think another Plato, an
empiricist immanent, bodily Plato? In my opinion, it is, and this is the task that
Deleuze´s project of reversal entrusted future philosophy with.
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